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THE TENNESSEE RETAILERS' SALES TAX, ACT 1
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TIE TAX
The primary consideration in the adoption of a tax by a state is the con-
stitutional framework into which it is to be fitted.2 Probable litigation is a
factor of importance in the choice of a tax. If there are no complicating fac-
tors, a simple tax on sales seems to be one of the forms of excise tax most
easily sustainable under the Tennessee Constitution. Indeed, Tennessee at an
early date had a sales tax which apparently met with court approval.3
The most inclusive authority upon which to base an excise tax in Ten-
nessee is the clause which states that "the legislature shall have power to tax
Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as they may from time
to time direct." 4 The extensive scope of this clause has long been estab-
lished. "A privilege is whatever the Legislature choose to declare to be a
privilege and to tax as such." 5
The first case to come before the Tennessee Supreme Court on this Act
confirms the right of the state to declare selling a taxable privilege.6 The
fact that the buying is of food to eat in order to live was held to be immaterial.
There is no natural right in the form of a business transaction that is in-
herently exempt from taxation, if the Legislature declares it to be a privileges
Will the same constitutional provision justify the tax on the "use" df
property? By the terms of the statute, "'Use' means and includes the exer-
cise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the
ownership thereof, except that it shall not include the sale at retail of that
1. TENN. PUB. AcTs 1947, c. 3; TENN. CODE §§ 1328.22-1328.39 (Williams, Supp.
1947). Further references to the Act will be by section number in the original act, with-
out repeating citations to the Act. The Commissioner of Finance and Taxation has pub-
lished a pamphlet Tennessee Retailers' Sales Tax Act Rides and Regulations. Reference to
these rules in this comment will be by number of the rule without further citation to this
pamphlet.
2. For discussion of the constitutional framework, see generally, BRANNEN, TAXATION
N TENNESSEE, C. 1 (1920) ; Anderson, The Constitutional Basis of Taxation in Ten-
nessee, 15 TENN. L. REV. 280 (1938); O'Connor, The Availability of a Sales Tax in
Tennessee, 12 TENN. L. REv. 249 (1934).
3. TENN. CODE §§ 543-49, 553 (Meigs & Cooper, 1858). Sec. 543 reads "all
sales of merchandise by a merchant or pedlar, shall be taxable," Repealed as to merchants
by TENN. PuB. AcTs 1869-70, c. 45, § 1. See The State v. Crawford, M'Neill & Co., 2
Head 460 (Tenn. 1859).
4. TENN. CoNsT., Art. II, § 28.
5. Kurth v. State, 86 Tenn. 134, 136 (.1887). Accord, The Turnpike Cases, 92 Tenn.
369, 22 S. W. 75 (1893) ; Burke v. Memphis, 94 Tenn. 692, 30 S. W. 742 (1895).
6. Hooten v. Carson, CCH, State Tax Reporter-Tenn. p. 6308 (Tenn. Feb. 28, 1948).
7. See Maguire, Taxing the Exercise of Natural Rights in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS
273 (1934).
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property in the regular course of business." s This definition appears so
broad as to fall short of complete ownership in but one particular: the power
to sell at retail. But for this one exception, this would appear to be a tax on
property. And yet this one limitation seems decisive. With substantially the
same definition of "use" 9 these statutes have been consistently upheld.' 0
Mr. Justice Cardozo stated the principle upon which the use tax is dis-
tinguished: "The privilege of use is only one attribute, among many, of the
bundle of privileges that make up property or ownership. . . .A state is at
liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the faggots
and lay the charge distributively." 11 Since the attributes adhering to this
taxable privilege fall short of being complete ownership, since the tax is not
upon ownership but upon only a partial manifestation of ownership, and in
view of the fact that the legislature has declared that such a transaction shall
be a privilege, the tax imposed has been uniformly regarded as a privilege or
excise tax and not as a property tax.' 2
The effect which certain other provisions in the Tennessee Constitution
may have on the Act may be briefly adverted to at this point. Since Evans v.
McCabe,13 graduated income taxes as a source of revenue are not possible.
The only income taxes that appear to be constitutional are those imposed
upon income derived from stocks and bonds.14 This may rule out certain
forms of gross receipts taxes which might be characterized as income taxes,
but would not appear to affect a sales tax.
The state constitution exempts from taxation "the direct product of
the soil in the hands of the producer." 15 The Tennessee Supreme Court has
8. Sec. 2(h).
9. CAL. CODE REv. & TAX § 6009 (Deering, 1944) ; IOWA CODE § 423.1 (1946). Such
a broad definition is not necessary and might jeopardize the Act. For more restrictive
definitions see Miss. CODE ANi. § 10149 (Supp. 1946); WASH. CODE § 967.1 (Pierce,
1944).
10. Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Johnson, 13 Cal. 2d 545, 90 P. 2d 572 (1939); State
Tax Commission v. General Trading Co., 233 Iowa 877, 10 N. W. 2d 659 (1943); Van-
c6uver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. 2d 14 (1935). See Notes, 129 A. L. R.
222 (1940), 153 A. L. R. 609 (1943).
11. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., ,300 U. S. 577, 582 (1937).
12. Other distinctions have been made by courts between property and use taxes
because the declaration of intention by the Legislature is not considered as conclusive: (1)
The method adopted in fixing amount of tax. The property taxes usually are fixed by
an assessment. A privilege tax has no prior assessment but is fixed by the extent to
which the conferred privileges are enjoyed or exercised by the taxpayer, irrespective of
the nature of the property; (2) The value of the property is not necessarily controlling in
a privilege tax. Value is an essential consideration in imposing a property tax because
almost universally the "equal and uniform" clauses apply to property taxes. See Note,
103 A. L. R. 18 (1936).
13. 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S. W. 2d 159, 617 (1932). TENN. CONST., Art. II, § 28 re-
quires all property taxes to be equal and uniform7Exceptions to the equal and uniform
clause are then set forth. Income taxes on stocks and bonds not taxed ad valorem are
permitted. The court adopted the rule that an enumeration of exceptions excludes all others
and, therefore, no other type of income could be taxed.
14. TENN. CQXST., Art II, § 28; Shields v. Williams, 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S. W. 2d
261 (1929).
15. TErNT. Co s., Art. II, § 28.
COMMENTS
declared that water taken from a spring on a farm and sold by its owner in
a nearby city is taxable not by a tax on water but by a. privilege tax levied
upon the business of selling water. Thus, the privilege of selling the direct'
products of the soil may be taxed. 16
The title of any statute is subject to the provision that it express the
subject of the bill and no bill may embrace more than one subject.17 The
plaintiff in Hooten v. Carson 18 contended that the body of the Act was
broader then the title, but the court simply pointed out that everything in
the body of the Act was germane to the title.
The effect of the provision in the Declaration of Rights 19 prohibiting
the taking of a man's services without the consent of his representatives or
without compensating him, will be considered in connection with the dis-
cussion of enforcement of the Act.
II
THE SALES TAx
In indicating the coverage of the sales tax, the Act declares that "every
person is exercising a taxable privilege [1] who engages in the business of
selling tangible personal property at retail in this State, or [2] who rents
or furnishes any of the things or services taxable under this Act, or [3]
who stores for use or consumption in this State any item or article of tangible
personal property ... and who leases or rents such property within the State
of Tennessee." 29
Certain methods of exercising these privileges, such as casual sales or
sales for resale, are exempted from the tax. They will be treated in the sub-
topic on exemptions. The nature of sales transactions remaining subject to
the tax may now be analyzed and treated in detail.
(a) Retail Sales
The Act provides that a sale is the transfer of title, possession or both
of tangible personal property.21 A retail sale is a sale to a consumer or to
16. Seven Springs Water Co. v. Kennedy, 156 Tenn. 1, 299 S. W. 792 (1927)
(dictum that farming is a taxable privilege) ; But cf. City of Nashville v. Hager, 5 Tenn.
Civ. App. 192 (1914).
17. TENN. CONST., Art. II, § 17. This clause is construed liberally. Warre_ v.
Walker, 167 Tenn. 505, 71 S. W. 2d 1057 (1934). See Couch v. State, 140 Tenn. 156,
203 S. W. 831 (1918) ; Goetz v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451, 278 S. W. 417 (1925).
18. Supra note 6.
19. TENr. CONST., Art. I, § 21.
20. Sec. 3. See Cohen, The Taxable Transaction in Consumers' Taxes,,8 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 530 (1941).
21. Sec. 2(b). See Wahrhaftig, Meaning of Retail Sale and Storage, Use or Other
Consumption, 8 LAW & CONTE,,P. PROB. 542 (1941).
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any person for any purpose other than for resale.22 The usual form of this
transaction is the ordinary over-the-counter cash sale.
Many products that are sold at retail are the result of extensive process-
ing. To tax all the items that make up a finished article of tangible personal
property would impose a serious burden of multiple taxation. The object is
to tax each article, if possible, only once. One method of accomplishing this
result is to exempt sales of those materials which retain a recognizable iden-
tity in the finished "product.23 This excludes most chemicals and other raw
materials. The more general test is to exempt all those materials which be-
come a component or constituent 'part of a finished product of tangible per-
sonal property intended for retail sale. If an item becomes a component part,
it is not taxed until the final retail sale; if it does not, but is used incidentally
to the manufacture of the finished product, it is taxed upon procurement by
the processor for such use.
For exarpple, printer's ink becomes a component part of a book for sale
at retail and the sale of the ink is therefore not taxable.2 4 Coal provides
energy for the manufacturing processes but does not become a constituent
part of the finished product and therefore is taxable.25 The Ohio Sales Tax
exempts products which are used "directly in the production of tangible per-
sonal property for sale by manufacturing .... ,, 26 This would exempt coal.
But this is not the case under the Tennessee Act. The exemption applies only
to sales of such articles as become component parts of the finished product.27
Transactions involving building materials present many difficult prob-
lems. If the owner of real property buys these materials to be used by him
in the construction of a house for his on use, the purchases are clearly sub-
ject to the tax.28 But suppose the owner of the realty employs a contractor
to build the house for him; the contractor buys the materials and builds a
house out of them and the owner pays the contractor for the house. The
house, being attached to the land, is regarded as real property. The contrac-
tor has not bought tangible personal property to be resold as personal prop-
erty. It was meant to be resold as real property. The contractor is thus the
final user or consumer of the materials as tangible personal property and
should therefore be liable for the tax.
2 9
If the owner only wants an improvement made-e.g., a concrete floor
22. Sec. 2(c) 1.
23. Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Nudelman, 371 Ill. 217, 20 N. E. 2d 277 (1939) [Case
interpreted ILL. ANN. STATS. c. 120, § 440 (Smith-Hurd, 1940); Section amended to
conform with component part test. ILL. ANN. STATS. c. 120, § 440 (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
1947)]. See Rule 40.
24. Rule 67.
25. Rule 15.
26. Oiaio GEN. CODE §§ 5546-1,'5546-25 (Page, Supp. 1947).




in' the basement-the same reasoning applies. The contractor buys cement-
to be used in making the concrete, the cement, becomes a component part of
the finished product, but the finished product is real property, not tangible
personal property. By the analysis above, the contractor was the final'user
and must pay the tax on his purchase of the cement.
The presumption that a fixture is intended should not be conclusive.
The owner may purchase a cabinet or a stove that he does not intend to be-
come a part of the realty. The owner then would have bought tangible per-
sonal property and he should pay the tax. The presumption appears reason-
able, however, that the contractor purchases in order to sell fixtures and he
should bear the burden of proof that he is actually selling tangible personal
property.
Suppose the contractor claims that he is really not selling property or
that what he sells forms only a very small proportion of what he turns over
to the owner. To tax his purchases is to tax his skill and the services he is
rendering. Under a statute like that in Illinois, where the tax was on anyone
engaged in the occupation of selling tangible personal property at retail,30
it was held that such a, contractor was not engaged in the occupation of mak-
ing retail sales.31 Under a tax of this character it becomes immaterial what
sort of property passes. The controlling factor is the occupation of him who
transfers the property. But when, as under the Tennessee tax, what is taxed
is the privilege of engaging in a retail sale and a retail sale is the transfer of
title, possession, or both, any person who in the course of his business does
any retail selling will be taxed. Service and skill enter into any human ac-
tivity and the proportionate amounts are immaterial if they form part of a
transaction that includes a retail transfer of tangible personal property.32
The amount of sales tax paid is determined by the sales price of the
property at the time of transfer. The Tennessee Act expressly states that
the sales price includes "any services that are a p art of'the sale.. without
dny deduction therefrom on account of the -cost of the property sold, the
cost of materials used, labor or service costs, ... or any other expense what-
soever..... 33
Under the Tennessee Act, if a party supplied cloth to a tailor to make a
suit for him, he would pay a sales tax on this finished product of tangible
30. ILL. ANN. STATS. C. 120, § 441 (Smith-Hurd, 1940).
31. Material Service Corporation v. McKibbin, 380 I1. 226, 43 N. E. 2d 939 (1942).
In Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 11. 626, 12 N. E. 2d 635 (1937) optometrists were de-
clared to be professional men not subject to the tax even for the frames and lenses they
transfer to patients. See Herman, Who Are Taxable?-Basic Problems in Definition
Under the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 522 (1941).
32. Cusick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky., 204, 84 S. W. 2d 14 (1935) ; People ex rel.




personal property.34 A tax would be paid on the sales price of a portrait paint-
ing even though the actual materials used would be but a minute percentage
of the actual sales price.35
To facilitate administration, certain transactions are declared to be
services where difficulty would be encountered in ascertaining with pre-
cision the value of the property transferred. By the Commissioner's ruling 36
shoe repairmen are deemed to be rendering a service and payments to them
for such services are 'not taxed. These repairmen pay a tax on the goods
purchased by them and used in the performance of such services. If services
rendered include the installation of'parts and the parts are billed separately,
a ruling 37 permits payment of the tax on the parts only. If there is no sep-
arate billing and the parts are computable, the tax is on the whole transaction.
These distinctions of the Commissioner seem tenuous and appear not en-
tirely justified in view of the all inclusiveness of the definition of "sales
price" in the act.38 The reason they are made is probably one of expediency
and administration before which logic and purity of analysis frequently must
bow.
(b) Conditional Sales
Conditional sales in which "the possession of property is transferred but
,the seller retains title as security for the payment of the price" are expressly
considered sales and are thus taxable to the full amount of the contract price. 39
It is immaterial that installment payments are extended over a period of
time.40
There is no right to a refund of the tax paid upon recapture or repos-
session of the merchandise sold under a conditional sales contract.41 The
dealers will bear such losses themselves. 42 This is not unreasonable because a
statute requires the seller of repossessed property in a conditional sale to
sell to the highest bidder 43 and if any deficiency results from this sale, the
seller still has a claim against the buyer.44 On the other hand, when purchases
are returned by the buyer and the dealer makes a refund, the Act provides
34. Sec. 2(b).
35. Rule 6; cf. Saverio v. Carson, 208 S.W.2d 1018 (Tenn. 1948) (operator of diaper
service who rented diapers to customers and then laundered these diapers for such rentees,
*was liable for the tax regardless ofthe relative value of service rendered as compared with
.the return on the property rented).
36. Rule 69.
37. Rule 54.
38. Supra note 33.
39. Sec. 2(b).
40. Gardner-White Co. v. Dunckel, 296 Mich. 225, 295 N. W. 624 (1941) ; Olympic
Motors v. McCroskey, 15 Wash. 2d 665, 132 P. 2d 355 (1942); Rule 28.
42. Rule 52.
43. TENN. CODE, § 7287 (Williams, 1934).
44. Id., § 7290.
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that the dealer may reimburse himself for the amount of the tax previously
paid.
45
(c) Rentals and Leases
As previously indicated, a sale is the transfer of title, possession, or
both.46 Leases and rentals present the fact situations where only possession
passes with no intention to pass title.47 Not every bailment is a lease or rent-
al; only such leases or rentals of tangible personal property are taxed which
are the business or part of the established business of the lessor or renter.
48
Common taxable situations are the rental of motion picture films by a dis-
tributing agency which have been uniformly upheld 
49 and, with the excep-
tion of Arkansas,50 the rental of an automobile without a driver.
III
THE USE TAx
When a state imposes a sales tax, the immediate reaction of all potential
buyers is to shop elsewhere to avoid the payment of this tax. Some device is
necessary to protect sellers within the taxing state and also to protect the
sales tax itself, the revenues from which are needed by the state. The answer
to this problem is the use tax.51
The question of whether use, even when very broadly defined, can be
the basis for a privilege tax has been considered. The answer has been
consistently in the affirmative. The Tennessee Act after defining "use," 52 de-
clares that for the purposes of the statute "the use, or consumption, or
distribution, or storage to be used or consumed in this State of tangible per-
sonal property shall each be equivalent to a sale at retail." 53 This would ap-
pear to fix the coverage of the use tax on tangible personal property purchased
outside the state as though bought from a Tennessee vendor.54 All the ex-
emptions and limitations that apply to the sales tax apply likewise to the use
45. Sec. 13.
46. Sec. 2(b).
47. Sec. 2(f); Rule 32.
48. Sec. 3(c); Saverio v. Carson, supra note 35.
49. Saenger Realty Corporation v. Grosjean, 194 La. 470, 193 So. 710 (1940);
United Artists Corporation v. Taylor, 248 App. Div. 207, 288 N. Y. Supp. 946 (1st Dep't
1936) aff'd, 273 N. Y. 334, 7 N. E. 2d 254 (1937).
50. U-Drive-'Em Service Co. v. State, by Hardin, 205 Ark. 501, 169 S. W. 2d 584
(1943) (The court distinguished between permanent and temporary possession and in
this case "The rentee simply has the temporary custody of the car and is a mere
temporary bailee.").
51. People's Gas & Electric Co. v. State Tax Commission, 28 N. W. 2d 799 (Iowa.
1947); Brown, The Future of Use Taxes, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 495 (1941); Com-
ment, The Use Tax, 16 IND. L. J. 260 (1940).
52. Sec. 2(h).
53. Sec. 4.
54. Introduction, Rules and Regulations Relating to The Tennessee Use Tax. Supra
note 1.
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tax. "Use" does not include sale at retail.55 Extra-state purchases 01 agri-
cultural products bought directly from the farmer are not taxable.56
The use of an article is taxed according to its cost price 57 at the time
of its importation into the state "after it has come to rest in this State and
has become a part of the mass of property in this State." 68
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pointed out that "A sales tax is a tax
on the freedom of purchase. . . .A use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of
that which was purchased." 59 The use tax is not an additional tax. It is not
paid if a sales tax of equal amnount has already been paid upon the trans-
action.60 It does not penalize or place at any disadvantage these extra state
sales. It merely makes them subject to an equal tax.
IV
EXEMPTIONS
(a) Sales of Agricultural Products
The exemption of farm products is one of the most debated points of
discussion in the general field of sales taxes. The finding that this exemption
is unreasonable could result, as it did in Illinois,61 in the invalidating of
the entire act. The theory of statutory construction leading to this result is
that when exemptions in a statute are found to be invalid, the entire act may
be declared void if it appears that the coverage of the tax has been so widened
that it is improbable that the legislature would have passed the act at all if
it were necessary to tax this exempted class.62 There is no separability
clause in the Sales Tax statute and it is uncertain whether the court would
find this clause separable if the exemption were invalidated.
The equal and uniform protection of the laws clause in the Tennessee
Constitution refers only to property taxed ad zalorem.63 A person being
subjected to an excise tax is protected by the other provisions that he be
not the object of a special law 64 and that he be not deprived of his property,
"but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." 65
55. Supra note 52.
56. Supra note 54.
57. Sec. 3(b). Cost price defined in Sec. 2(e).
58. Sec. 4.
59. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 330 (1944).
60. Sec. 4.
61. Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N. E. 113 (1933).
62. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2412 (3d ed.
Horack, 1943) ; Pettit v. White County, 152 Tenn. 660, 280 S. W. 688 (1926) ; Edwards
v. Davis, 146 Tenn. 615, 244 S. W. 359 (1922).
63. TENN. CoNsT., Art. II, § 28; Shields v. Williams, 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S. W. 2d
261 (1929).
64. TENN. CONs ., Art. XI, § 8; Cumberland University v. Golladay, 152 Tenn. 82,
274 S. W. 536 (1924).
65. TENN. CONST., Art. I, § 8.
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"The clause 'LAW OF THE LAND,' means a general and public law, equally
binding upon every member of the community." 66 Neither a tax nor any
other general law has to apply to every person in the state. All that is
required is that the general law be made to refer to a class of persons, that
the class be selected on a reasonable basis, and that no persons, ostensibly
of that class, be arbitrarily or unreasonably exempted from the effects of
this general law.
"[T]he Legislature has a wide range of discretion in distinguishing,
selecting, and classifying objects of legislation because of the function of
the legislation and the purposes to which it is addressed. It suffices, if it is
practical, and is not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary." 67 ,
. In order for this Act to be valid in view of these general principles,
there must be a reasonable basis for exempting from the sales tax a trans-
action that apparently is a retail sale, e.g., the farmer selling poultry tq a
consumer.
The Act declares that it is a taxable privilege to engage in the busi-
ness of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state.68 "The
term 'business' shall not be construed in this act to include occasional and
isolated sales or transactions by a person who does not hold himself out as
engaged in business." 69 Farmers are not usually in the business of retail
selling. They are primarily engaged in producing and generally sell to
grain and produce houses for processing or further sale. These transactions
would be exempted as being a sale for resale.
7°
The Tennessee Act specifically points to the exemption as applying
only to sales direct from the farm by the farmer himself. The phrase,
"direct from the farm" probably precludes a retail store elsewhere for the
sale of such produce,71 but would it preclude peddling in a nearby city by
the farmer?
Any taxation of farmers' sales creates a difficult administrative prob-
lem. Two writers on the subject have remarked that their experience
"would lead one to think that the farmers make little pretense of collecting
the tax on products sold to consumers." 72 These problems of collection
66. Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 259, 270 (Tenn. 1829)'; State of Tennessee for use
of Roane County v. Burnett, 53 Tenn. 186, 189 (1871).
67. Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 476-7, 239 S. W. 767, 769 (1922). "[W]hen
the classification made and stated in a statute is challenged, if any state of facts reason-
ably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed." Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 108,
223 S. W. 844, 850 (1920). "It is unnecessary that the reasons for the classification shall
appear on the face of the legislation." Knoxtenn Theatres v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 497,
505, 151 S. W. 2d 164, 167 (1941).
68. Sec. 3.
69. Sec. 2(i).
70. Sec. 2(c) 1.
71. Curry v. Reeves, 195 So. 428 (Ala. 1940).
72. BLAKEY & BLAKEY,'SALES TAXES AND OrTaER ExciSEs 20 (1945).
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from persons "widely scattered and inured to habits of individualism" 7
appear self-evident. A classification on the basis of administrative necessity 74
in a situation like this seems reasonable.
Most of the states faced with the problem have found this exemption
reasonable and have upheld it.75 But to an Illinois court it was a matter of
common knowledge that there are many farmers who not only produce but
also conduct the business of selling produce only to consumers at retail.
76
As to this type of farmer, the court insisted that an exemption could not
be validly made and voided the entire statute.
There seems little reason to suppose that this. exemption would be
found unreasonable under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mr. Justice Stone has declared that the "legislature is not
bound to tax every'member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of
degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny
they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable
state of facts which would support it." 77 The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that it regards farmers as a distinct class in our society with "a differ-
ent economic significance" 78 and, as such, the Court is not likely to object
to the exemption of farmers from a sales tax.
(b) Sales of Particular Products and Specific Classes of Sales
A number of products are specifically exempted from this tax.,7 In
most cases they are taxed under other statutes.80 In other instances, public
policy withdraws them from this taxable privilege, e.g., school books and
school lunches.8 '
The tax is on the sale of tangible personal property and the term
73. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 145 (1940).
74. Developments in the Law-Taxation---1933, 47 H, v. L. REV. 1209, 1228 (1934).
75. Moore v. State Board of Charities and Corrections, 239 Ky. 729, 40 S. W. 2d
349 (1931) ; State ex reL. Botkin v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 251 N. W. 189 (1933) ; State
ex reL. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P. 2d 91 (1933).
76. Winter v. Barrett, 352 I1. 441, 186 N. E. 113 (1933).
77. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509 (1937). See Sholley,
Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REv. 229, 388 (1938).
78. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 145 (1940).
79. Sec. 6. See Conlon, Express or Implied Exclusions from Consumption Excises
-Types of Consumers, 8 LAw & COxTEMP. PROD. 594 (1941); Framptoq & Smith, Com-
modities and Transactions Exempt from Consumption Taxes, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.1. PRoD.
579 (1941).
80. (1) Gasoline; (2) motor vehicle fuel now taxed 7¢ per gallon; (3) manufac-
tured tobacco products; (4) alcoholic beverages; (5) beer; (6) water (not including
mineral or carbonated water, or any water put up in bottles, jugs, or other containers) ;
(7) electric power or energy; (8) natural or artificial gas (not including butane or other
liquefied gas unless used by a municipality as part of a gas distribution system).
81. Also (1) fertilizer and containers for farm products; (2) field and garden seeds
when sold directly to the farmer; (3) newspapers. By § 2(c) 2, "materials, container,.
labels, sacks or bags used for packaging tangible personal property for shipment or sale"
is exempted from both sales and use tax.
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"tangible" is specifically declared not to include "stocks, bonds, notes, in-
surance, or other obligations or securities." 82
Certain types of sales are exempted regardless of any other factor.
No sale for resale is taxable. No casual sale is taxable. No sale of other
than tangible personal property is taxable. There is no tax upon a sale
that has already borne another similar tax in another state of an amount
equal to the Tennessee tax. If the amount 'of the prior tax is less than the
Tennessee tax, the Tennessee buyer must pay the difference.83
(c) Sales to Particular Purchasers
The tax "shall not apply to the use, sale, or distribution of religious
publications to or by Churches or other religious or charitable institutions
for use in the customary religious or charitable activities." 84 The exemption
is limited to the transfer of religious publications and all other sales by or
to such institutions are taxable.
85
All "sales made to the State of Tennessee or any County or municipality
within the State" are exempted from thistax.86 This exemption directs at-
tention to the constitutional question: Are 'sales to the Federal government
or one of its agencies taxable? The Panhandle Oil case said that they were
not.87 The court later refused to exempt the holder of a cost-plus govern-
ment contract.8 8 Mr. Justice Stone said that this latter case overruled the
Panhandle Oil case.89 This result is not certain due to the clear differences
in the fact situations of the two cases.90 The Commissioner has ruled that
sales when "billed and sold directly to, and .... paid for by the government
of theUnited States, its departments or agencies . . ." are not taxable:91
(d) Sales in Interstate Comnerce
Neither Congress 92 nor any state 93 has the power to tax exports to
a foreign country. A state may not tax the sale of articles destined for





87. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) (gasoline
purchases by Coast Guard).
88. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. 'S. 1 (1941); see Note, Constitutional and
Legislative Bases of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 51 YALE L. J. 482 (1942).
.89. Penn. DAiries v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U. S. 261, 277 (1943).
90. See Note, A Review of Intergovernmental Immunities froin Taxation, 4 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 48 (1946).
91. Rule 58.
92. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
93. Id. § 10.
94. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,, 329 U. S. 69 (i946) (oil
from California to New Zealand); Note, 14 U. of Cm. L. Ra. 669 (1947); 42 ILL. L.
REv. 251 (1947) ; 59 Ham,. L. REv. 627 (1946).
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Tennesseee statute. specifically exempts from taxation any tangible personal
property "imported into this State or produced or manufactured in this
State for export." 95 If "export" connotes shipment to a foreign country-
as it does in the Federal courts-- 96 this exemption is as it should be. If "export"
includes 'shipment to a sister state, the language is too broad in that it is by no
means certain that the shipping state is precluded from taxing. The factors
determining the taxability of property under a sales tax do not include the
motive in manufacture.
A state may not tax imports,9 7 but as indicated above a state may tax
the privilege of use of property imported into the state, either from a
foreign country or another state, when the goods "are sold, removed from
the original package, or put to the use for which they are imported," 98 or,
as the Act puts it, the property may be taxed "after it has come to rest in
this state and has become a part of the mass of property in this state." 99
In examining state taxation of interstate commerce, there are only
two situations that are settled law. If the sale takes place entirely in Ten-
nessee, the domicile of the parties and the proposed destination of the goods
are immaterial. The sale is then taxable by Tennessee. 100 If the sale is con-
summated outside of Tennessee and the goods are brought into this state
for use or consumption in this state, the goods are taxable in Tennessee, not by
the sales tax 101 but by the use tax.10 2 The sole restriction on this use tax is
that it may not be imposed if a similar tax of equal amount has already
been imposed on the transaction in another state. 10 3 It is settled that inter-
state commerce must bear its fair share of the tax burden 104 but it must
not be subjected to multiple taxation simply because it is interstate com-
merce.105
The problems arise over the variations within these extremes. In at-
tempting to prevent multiple taxation of a single transaction through the
95. Sec. 4.
96. Swan and Finch Co. v. United States, 190 U. S. 143 (1903).
97. Supra note 93.
98. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 657 (1945). See note by Thomas
Reed Powell on when an import ceases to be an import. 58 HARv. L. REv. 858 (1945)
see Cases Noted, 45 COL. L. REv. 661 (1945).
99. Sec. 4.
100. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of Indiana, 322
U. S. 340 (1944). Accord, Rule 29 ("It is immaterial that the property purchased will be
later transported outside the State."). See Recent Case, 13 GEo. WAsh. L. Rev. 115
(1944).
101. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944); Recent Case, 13 GEo. WAS1!.
L. REV. 117 (1944).
102. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
103. Sec. 4.
104. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938); Warren
& Schlesinger,'Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 COL. L. REV.
49 (1938).
105. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White &
Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939) ; Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946)
Note, 56 YALE L. J. 898 (1947).
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use of the interstate commerce clause, the Court may possibly be applying
the principles of conflict of laws to determine the state in which the sale
is consummated and that state alone may be permitted to tax. For example,
Indiana could not tax a sale of stock made in New York by an Indiana
broker,10 6 but New York could tax a sale of Pennsylvania coal when the
sale was completed in New York. 0 7 Arkansas could not tax a sale in Ten-
nessee of goods destined for Arkansas 106 but New Mexico could impose
a tax on advertising spade sold by a magazine published in New Mexico
and destined for intra and extra-state circulation. 10 9 But the law still
remains in much confusion,110 and with a situation of such uncertainty,
the phrasing of the Tennessee Act seems prudent: "[N]or is it the intention
of this Act to levy a tax on bona fide interstate commerce." m
V. ENFORCEMENT OF TIHE ACT
The tax levied by the Act is imposed upon the purchaser and col-
lected by the dealer." 2 The dealer cannot advertise that he will absorb the
tax 113 and if he fails to collect it he is liable for it himself." 4 The dealer
is therefore the collecting agent of the state and in the performance of
his duties is required to keep records, file returns, and remit the tax.
This is not a deprivation of property or services without due process and
is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 5 The Tennessee con-
stitution forbids the taking of a man's particular services without the
consent of his representatives or without just compensation to him for
such services." 6 Presumably passage of this law expresses validly the
consent of each dealer's representatives, and the Act provides for com-
pensation to the dealer ,for his services as the state's collecting agent." 7
But when these duties are imposed upon out-of-state vendors, is this
not a burden on interstate commerce? The answer has been uniformly in,
106. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946) ; Comment, 46 MicH. L. REv. 50 (1947).
107. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
108. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
109. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
110. For detailed treatment of the cases, see Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate
Commerce, 52 HARv. L. REv. 617 (1939) ; Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes,
53 HARy. L. REv. 909 (1940); Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HA~v.
L. REv. 501, 710 (1947); Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Commerce, 47
CoL. L. REv. 211 (1947); McNamara, Jurisdictional and Interstate Commerce Problems
in the Imposition of Excises on Sales, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 482 (1941) ; Overton,
State Taxation of Interstate Transactions, 19 TENN. L. REv. 870 (1947).
111. Sec, 4.
112. Sec. 5(b). In general, see Huston & Berryman, Collection and Enforcement
of State Consumption Excise Taxes, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1941).
113. Sec. 5(e).
114. Sec. 5(d).
115. Pierce Oil Corporation v. Hopkins, 264 U. S. 137 (1924); Monamotor Oil
Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934).
116. TENN. CONsT. Art. I, § 21.
117. Sec. 8(b) (dealer may deduct 2% of tax due).
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the negative. 18 This is a reasonable price for the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the state. The authority to impose these duties has been said to
exist even after the power to force compliance has gone. The "impotence
of state power" to get jurisdiction over an extra-state vendor does not
affect the vendor's duty to collect.'1 9 But this impasse is prevented under
the Tennessee Act by making both the vendee and the vendor dealers for
the purposes of the use tax. 20 The out-of-state vendor may be authorized
to collect the tax if he applies for a certificate of registration.' 2 ' If he has
no such certificate, the Tennessee purchaser must remit the tax to the
Commissioner.
122
In case of failure on the part of the dealer to remit the tax whether he
collected it or not, the Commissioner has the power to issue a distress
warrant and levy on the dealer's property.12' Suppose that instead of do-
ing, this, the Commission went into equity and petitioned for a mandatory
injunction against a dealer who had not collected the tax in the past and
indicated that he would not do so in the future, ordering him to collect
and pay the tax. A Mississippi court granted such an injunction on the
ground that the defendant's actions were seriously impairing the efficiency
of the state tax collector.124 This is clearly an injunction to restrain a
crime, and aside from the burden imposed upon equity courts, is not a
recommended solution to the Commissioner's troubles.
All sellers in the state must register with the Commissioner, 125 keep
records, and have them available for inspection by the Comissioner. 120
This control extends also to wholesalers and jobbers who are in a position
to know of all sales of tangible personal property in this state. They too
must keep this information available for the Commissioner at all reasonable
hours.127 Transporation companies must open their books to the conmis-
sioner so that he may "determine what dealers . . . are importing or other-
wise shipping articles of tangible personal property which are liable for
said tax." 128 
.
118. Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939); Nelson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359 (1941) ; General Trading Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944) ; Recent Case, 7 Mo. L. REv. 86 (1942) ; Note, 57 HARV.
L. REv. 1086 (1944) (author is Thomas Reed Powell).
119. Mr. Justice Douglas in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359, 364
(1941).
120. Sec. 4.
121. Rules 202 & 206.
122. Rule 208.
123. Sec. 11.
124. State ex rel. Rice v. Allen, 180 Miss. 659, 177 So. 763 (1938). See Wade, The
Work of the Mississippi Supreme Court for the September, 1937, and the March, 1938,
Terms: Taxation, 11 Miss. L. J. 65, 75 (1938).
125. Sec. 16.




Finally, no one not a common carrier may import goods into the state
without a special permit. Importation without such a permit, "shall be
construed as an attempt to evade payment of said tax" and the vehicle
used may be seized and is subject to forfeiture ,and sale.
129 The very
general terms of this latter authority in the Commissioner seem to state
that no one, without a permit, even if on a vacation trip, may bring a
purchased article, of whatever value, into this state Nvithout being subject
to having his car seized. The words in the statute and Rules, "consignee"
and "consignor," 130 indicate that this possibility is not the contemplated one
but the statutory words are most certainly too broad.'
3'
The Act provides both civil and criminal punishments for violations of
the statute. The civil penalties are all in one section. 3 2 The criminal
punishments are scattered through the Act with no apparent guiding prin-
ciple. No two punishments are the same. In one instance, the same offense
is punished in different sections by mutually exclusive penalties.
133 Some
offenses are assigned specific penalties and others are simply declared
misdemeanors and "punishable as such" 134 or "shall be punished as' pro-
vided by the general law." 135 The general code section provides for punish-
ments far greater than any of those specially mentioned in the Act.
3 6
This, of course, presents no legal problems but does indicate a certain
amount of careless draftsmanship of the Act. The statute was closely modelled
on that similar act of Louisiana,13 7 and yet in this matter of criminal punish-
ments there is a complete deviation. More uniformity and more careful ad-
justment of penalties to offenses would have made this feature of the Act
more satisfying.
VI. REMEDIES OF DISSENTING TAXPAYERS
Upon any claim of illegal assessment and collection, the Act gives the
129. Sec. 12; Rule 216.
130. Sec. 12 reads ". . . apply ... for a permit stating... the name and addres's of
the consignee"; Rule 216 reads ". . . must first obtain ... a permit stating ... the name
and address of the consignor and the name and address of the consignee." 1
131. The use tax is very difficult to administer and a great burden is lifted by the
common general exemption which runis as high as $50 a month. BLAKEY & BLAREY, SALES
TAXES AND OTHER EXCISES 19 (1945).
132. Sec. 8(c).
133. Sec. 10(e) states that "Any dealer . failing or refusing to furnish any return
.,or shall violate any other provision of this Act, punishment for which is not other-
wise herein provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ...." Punishment is $200 fine, 60
days or both. Sec. 10(g) reads "Any dealer who shall yiolate any other provision of this
Act, punishment for which is not otherwise herein provided, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. . . ." Punishment is $10 to $100 fine, 30 days, or both.
134. Sec. 7(c).
135. Sees. 9 (b) and 16:
136. TENN. CODE § 10756 (Williams, 1934) ("... shall be punished by imprison-
ment ... not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by-
both .... ").
137. LA. GEN. STATS. §§ 8648.26 et seq. (Dart Supp. 1947).
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dissentient the usual remedy-pay the tax, protest at time of payment,
and sue within thirty days. 38
A problem not peculiar to sales taxes but one which frequently arises
under them is the case of the dissenting collector who, having taken the
tax from the purchaser, is now unwilling to turn the tax over to the state
because of a claim that the tax is unconstitutional. Such dealer will not be
heard by the courts. It would be unjust enrichment for him to keep the
money he has collected from willing taxpayers. 39 And further, having
collected from such purchaser by claim of duty under the law, he will now
be estopped to deny the validity of the law in order to avoid remission to the
state of taxes so collected. 14
0
STANLEY D. RosE
138. Sec. 11. The general code sections stating these remedies are §§ 1790 ct seq.
In Saverio v. Carson 208 S. W. 2d 1018 (Tenn. 1948) plaintiff petitioned for a declaratory
judgment.
139. Cook v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 206 S. W. 20 (Ark. 1947) ; Wade v. State, 97
Colo. 52, 47 P. 2d 412 (1935) ; Shannon v. Hughes & Co., 270 Ky. 530, 109 S. W. 2d
1174 (1937); Kesbee v., McGoldrick, 278 N.°Y. 293, 16 N. E. 2d 288 (1938). See Note,
Disposition of Illegally Collected Sales Tax Receipts, 48 YALE L. J. 695 (1939); 18
B. U. L. Rav. 790 (1938); Recent Case, 52 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1938).
140. Henry County v. Standard Oil Co., 167 Tenn. 485, 487, 71 S. W. 2d 683 (1934)
(The county was seeking to recover taxes collected under a tax already declared unconsti-
tutional. Recovery denied. The court stated that "while estoppel may be urged for the
protection of a right, it can never create-a right").
